Why Europe should buy and fund Hrim-2 for itself and Ukraine
Big weapons go now
The attack on an ammunition depot in Bryansk was met by consternation by hysterical observers this week, as they assumed that this was the fateful red line that would cause Putin to launch a nuclear response against the West. This was the line, after the 17 before which were definitely also the line, ended up not being the line.
Reports suggested that the weapon used was ATACMS, a short-range ballistic missile given by the US that has proved effective in isolation, and would only be more effective if the US also donated many hundreds more and widened the targets it could be trained on. For now, it appears Ukraine’s northern border is the only permitted region, and for now, it could inflict heavy damage on massed Russian and North Korean troops in the region. If France and Britain are also allowed to give their own permission for Storm Shadow to take similar targets, then the damage could be meaningful, if not decisive (as an aside: no one weapon will be decisive, but the decision to arm Ukraine sufficiently to win would be).
For much of the war, Ukraine had to nurse a dwindling amount of Tochka missiles that are very useful but are available in extremely limited quality. As it stands, Ukraine appears able to procure a handful at a time - perhaps from Bulgaria - or refurbish its own dead stock at a similarly slow pace. The addition of ATACMS, like HIMARS, gives the country an increase in both range and accuracy.
The delay from the US in allowing Ukraine to use ATACMS likely comes from Biden’s cowardice, and potentially the cynical approach of keeping Russia in a fight that is slowly bleeding it hollow. Increasing permission to Ukraine now keeps Russia interested in the fight, but at another increasing cost. The slow pace might also have a benefit for Ukraine, however bitterly earned. The country has had to focus its own efforts on developing the Hrim-2 ballistic missile.
According to the Ukrainian state, the programme has come close to fruition, and production has started. A mixture of long-range drones, drone missiles, cruise missiles and now ballistic missiles can be produced and used by Ukraine, but the nascent efforts are hamstrung by inefficiency, novelty and expense. For the rest of Europe, standing aside and gawping, this is a chance to both help Ukraine and themselves.
While Russia becomes increasingly belligerent, and assuredly moreso when peace of some kind is achieved in Ukraine, the Baltic border, and the Polish one with Kaliningrad, becomes a warm frontline, if not a searingly hot one. Retrospectively, most of the West agrees now that an increased military presence from itself or by supplied arms would have had exponentially better effect than later supplies. But by investing in the Hrim-2 programme, they would be getting in early for themselves, and adding to that essential late aid for Ukraine.
For now, Hrim-2 is not the most highly regarded ballistic missile in the world, but with a range of a few hundred miles, it could cause enormous damage to much of the logistical infrastructure helping the Russian war effort. At this point, it is also clear that industrial factories of almost any kind, barracks, oil depots, energy infrastructure, transport hubs, and civil service buildings, are eminently legitimate targets. If Ukraine could match the barrages of missiles and drones sent by Russia, or even get to a third of that level, the Russians have shown themselves unable to cope with much smaller and less sophisticated attacks. Ukraine reportedly has 100 Hrim-2 missiles, which feels like an overestimate for now, but sustained use of them on Russia would have palpably painful effects.
Europe, then, should step in. The Germans are too cowardly or craven to greenlight Taurus, so we can rule them out, but if the rest of Europe is content to stand up, then MBDA (owned by the French, Italians and UK) could lend their production capacity and their expertise to improve the effectiveness of the weapon. Committing hundreds of millions each would give Ukraine the chance to lower the unit cost, and give Europe’s armed forces the chance to equip themselves with effective ballistic missiles of their own.
Away from the straightforward benefit of having more things that make big explosions, there are two more benefits. By deploying an MBDA presence in Ukraine, it ties the fortune of Ukraine to the rest of Europe more deeply - it is an important thing not to lose control of. Additionally, as ATACMS could be snatched away post-Biden, it also gives the rest of the West the chance to strike out and achieve its own much-needed independence. Rumours suggest the US can quite reasonably dictate where Storm Shadow is used because it provides key technology. Hrim-2 is a sensible workaround, or complement, to those cruise missiles.
There is also what we might call the Israeli angle to all this. Just as Israel’s nuclear weapons and belligerence in its actions leaves the United States as something of a hostage, Ukraine’s lack of self-determination has left it at the mercy of inconsistent allies. If Ukraine develops a threatening amount of missiles that could reply in kind to Russia’s indiscriminate bombing of cities, and can also accurately vaporise Russian soldiers and facilities, there could be a tacit acknowledgement from the United States that unless Ukraine is allowed to fight aggressively and within reasonable limits, it can quickly make the conflict much less reasonable. At some point the war could be hairily close to definitively existential. At that point, Ukraine would likely be much more cold-blooded than it currently is.
Proportionality can always change. When it comes to Hrim-2, Europe could both benefit from buying some, developing it further, and improving a working relationship with Ukraine - for its own sake and Ukraine’s.